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Abstract: The argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and others, famously 
concludes that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. The paper aims to show 
that trust in the soundness of the argument is overrated – that philosophers who endorse its 
conclusion (especially Douglas and Wilholt) fail to refute two of the most important objections 
that have been raised to its soundness: Jeffrey’s objection that the genuine task of the 
scientist is to assign probabilities to (and not to accept or reject) hypotheses, and Levi’s 
objection that the argument is ambiguous about decisions about how to act and decisions 
about what to believe, that only the former presuppose value judgments, and that qua 
scientist, the scientist only needs to decide what to believe. 
 
1. Introduction 
It has become customary to divide the process of scientific discovery into three stages or 
contexts. In the context of discovery, objects of investigation are selected in accordance with 
considerations of relevance; in the context of justification, data are gathered to confirm or 
disconfirm hypotheses; and in the context of application, hypotheses are applied for various 
social or political purposes. It is widely agreed that value judgments operate in the contexts 
of discovery and application. Judgments about the respective value of objects of 
investigation at least partly determine the selection of these objects, and judgments about 
the values of social or political purposes play an important role when it comes to applications 
of scientific hypotheses. It is also widely agreed that value judgments necessarily operate in 
the contexts of discovery and application: that questions of relevance cannot be decided 
independently of value judgments, and that applications of scientific hypotheses presuppose 
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value judgments. What is less widely agreed is whether value judgments necessarily operate 
in the core of science, i.e. the context of justification. Many theorists believe that value 
judgments operate in the context of justification as a matter of fact. But what remains 
contested is whether value judgments necessarily operate in the context of justification: 
whether scientists are incapable of confirming or disconfirming hypotheses independently of 
the value judgments that they happen to endorse. 
The so-called argument from inductive risk (AIR) has been designed to support precisely this 
claim. It concludes that value judgments necessarily operate even in the core of science, that 
scientists necessarily make value judgments, or that the scientist qua scientist makes value 
judgments (and not qua the kind of person that the scientist happens to be). AIR may thus be 
read as a direct attack on the value-free ideal, i.e. an ideal that can be understood as the 
requirement that a specific realm of scientific activity, namely the context of justification, be 
free from science-external value judgments (cf. e.g. Schurz, 2014, p. 42). 
In the context of AIR, confirmation is understood as the assignment of a probability that is 
decided to be sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of a scientific hypothesis. Variants 
of AIR can be found in Churchman (1948) and Hempel (1965). But the variant that is typically 
discussed in more recent contributions to the debate goes back to a six-page essay by 
Rudner (1953). The variant says that 
(1) any scientist S rejects or accepts hypotheses qua scientist, 
(2) S accepts (rejects) hypothesis H iff S can assign a probability P to H and decides that 
P is (not) sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of H, 
(3) S’s decision whether P is (not) sufficiently high presupposes value judgments, 
(4) therefore, S makes value judgments qua scientist. 
Hempel (1965, p. 92) is the one who speaks of the “inductive risk” of accepting (rejecting) 
false (true) hypotheses. Accordingly, the derivation of (4) from (1) – (3) has become known 
as “argument from inductive risk”. 
At first sight, AIR appears to be quite strong. It seems that the acceptance or rejection of 
hypotheses and the assignment of probabilities are among the most genuine activities of 
scientists. Another strength is that the assignment of probabilities can be understood as 
inductive inference in the broadest sense of the term. The argument seems to remain sound, 
that is, if “probability” is replaced with “degree of confirmation” or “degree of belief” in 
premises (2) and (3). It also seems that the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses depends 
on decisions about the sufficiency of probabilities, and that these decisions depend on value 
judgments. 
	 3 
That chain of dependencies can be illustrated in various ways. Consider, for instance, the 
hypothesis H that a sample of a polio vaccine is free from active polio virus (cf. Jeffrey, 1956, 
pp. 241-2). If H were to be tested on a treatment group consisting entirely of mice, S would 
perhaps decide that a probability of 0.95 is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of H. If, 
however, H were to be tested on a treatment group consisting entirely of children, she would 
most probably decide that a probability of 0.95 is not sufficiently high. Whether or not she 
accepts H, depends on her decision about the sufficiency of P, and her decision about the 
sufficiency of P depends on a value judgment about the seriousness of acting on the basis of 
H if H is false. 
At the same time, the conclusion of the argument appears to be quite radical. Philosophers 
who have defended that conclusion more recently somewhat downplay its radicalness when 
arguing that accepting “the role of values in science does not eliminate the requirement for 
good arguments” (Douglas, 2000, p. 600), or that the “value judgments pervading scientific 
practice” are “reasonable” (Kitcher, 2011, p. 36). But the radicalness of the conclusion is 
adequately expressed by the remark by which Rudner (1953, p. 6) closes his essay: “[I]f the 
major point I have here undertaken to establish is correct, then clearly we are confronted with 
a first order crisis in science & methodology.” What the participants in the debate call 
“values” or “value judgments” are non-scientific values that include ideologies and material 
interests after all. 
The radicalness of the conclusion explains why some philosophers felt early on that they 
needed to object to the validity or soundness of AIR. Jeffrey (1956, p. 237), for instance, 
objects to premise (1) that “the activity proper to the scientist is the assignment of 
probabilities […] to […] hypotheses”, and not the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses. Levi 
(1962, p. 47), by contrast, can be read as objecting to a purported ambiguity in (2) and (3): 
as objecting that the decision referred to in (2) is a decision about what to believe, while the 
decision referred to in (3) is a decision about how to act, that only the latter presupposes 
value judgments, and that the scientist qua scientist only needs to decide what to believe. It 
is worth mentioning that Hempel (1949, p. 560), who is sometimes viewed as a proponent of 
AIR (cf. e.g. Douglas, 2000, pp. 560-2), raises an objection that is similar to Jeffrey’s in his 
review of Churchman’s Theory of Experimental Inference.2 
But most philosophers participating in the debate believe that these objections can be 
refuted. Rudner (1953, p. 4) anticipates Jeffrey’s objection when suggesting that assigning 
probability P to hypothesis H is the same as accepting the hypothesis H1 that the probability 
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of H is P, and that accepting H1 presupposes value judgments. Jeffrey (1956, p. 246) 
responds that assigning probability P to H is not the same as accepting H1. But Douglas 
(2009, 53-4) thinks that Jeffrey’s response leads into a vicious regress of assigning 
probabilities to probability assignments. Douglas (2016, pp. 614-5) and Wilholt (2009, p. 94) 
argue against Jeffrey that scientists should accept or reject hypotheses because they are 
responsible for the actions that are taken on the basis of these hypotheses. And Wilholt 
(2009, pp. 95-6) argues against Levi that his conception of a decision about what to believe 
“presupposes a sense of purity of epistemic activity that is exaggerated and unrealistic”. 
The present paper aims to show that Rudner, Douglas, and Wilholt do not manage to refute 
the objections raised by Jeffrey and Levi, and that trust in the soundness of AIR is 
accordingly overrated. The paper will argue, more specifically, that  
- assigning probability P to H without accepting the hypothesis H1 that the probability of 
H is P is unlikely to lead into a vicious regress of assigning probabilities to probability 
assignments. 
- scientists should accept or reject hypotheses only hypothetically, if they should 
accept or reject hypotheses at all. 
- decisions about what to believe might not be epistemically pure in the sense 
envisaged by Levi, but that what supplements decisions about what to believe may 
be pragmatic considerations that do not necessarily involve value judgments. 
The argument that scientists should accept or reject hypotheses only hypothetically is in fact 
an argument that Schurz (2013, pp. 325-8) develops in a paper that has appeared only in 
German, and that he mentions only briefly in his textbook on philosophy of science (cf. 
Schurz, 2014, p. 77). Schurz (2013, p. 330) also explains why we may concentrate on the 
inductive risk of accepting (rejecting) false (true) hypotheses when evaluating the soundness 
of AIR. Douglas (2000, p. 563) is right when observing that scientists “also take inductive 
risks in stages of science before acceptance or rejection of theories”. But these risks add up 
to the total risk of the scientific hypothesis that is relevant to public decision-making. And 
thus, it is not entirely correct to say that these risks are “never brought to the light of public 
decision-making” (Douglas, 2000, p. 563). 
Note that the paper does not exactly aim to explicitly defend Jeffrey’s or Levi’s objection. 
Defending both objections would be self-defeating because, as Levi (1960, p. 345; 1962, p. 
47) points out on several occasions, the view that the activity proper to the scientist is not the 
acceptance or rejection of hypotheses is incompatible with the view that the scientist qua 
scientist needs to decide what to believe. But the paper is not going to defend any one of the 
two objections either. It will remain undecided as to whether the activity proper to the 
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scientist is the assignment of probabilities or the acceptance and rejection of hypotheses.3 
What the paper aims to show is that AIR is weaker than often suggested because Rudner, 
Douglas, and Wilholt fail to refute Jeffrey’s and Levi’s objections. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will reproduce Douglas’s discussion of 
experiments that use laboratory animals to find out whether dioxins cause liver cancer 
because that discussion nicely illustrates the various stages of hypothesis confirmation in 
which inductive risk is present. But section 2 will also defend Schurz’s claim that the 
inductive risk that is present in these stages adds up to the total risk of the scientific 
hypothesis that is relevant to public decision-making. Section 3 will argue that assigning 
probability P to H without accepting the hypothesis H1 that the probability of H is P is unlikely 
to lead into a vicious regress, and that scientists should accept or reject hypotheses only 
hypothetically, if it is true that qua scientists, they should accept or reject hypotheses. 
Section 4 will try to show that the Higgs boson discovery exemplifies a decision about what 
to believe on the part of physicists: a decision that is epistemically pure in the sense of not 
depending on value judgments, but not epistemically pure in the sense of not depending on 
pragmatic considerations. Section 5 will argue that decisions about what to believe that are 
epistemically pure in this sense are also possible in sciences with clear non-epistemic 
impacts. Section 6 will conclude by briefly summarizing the line of argument and main 
findings of the paper, while also pointing to a number of limitations and questions for future 
research. 
 
2. Inductive risk: partial and total 
Douglas (2000, p. 563) argues, to repeat, that scientists “also take inductive risks in stages of 
science before acceptance or rejection of theories”. She distinguishes three such stages: one 
of selecting an appropriate level of statistical significance, one of evidence characterization 
and one of the interpretation of results. And she argues that value judgments necessarily 
operate in all three stages. 
Douglas illustrates her distinction by discussing experiments that use laboratory animals to 
find out whether dioxins cause liver cancer. In experiments of this kind, lab rats are assigned 
to a treatment and a control group by some randomizing procedure. Rats in the treatment 
group are dosed or exposed to dioxin, while rats in the control groups remain non-dosed. 
Since both control and dosed animals usually exhibit some liver cancer, what needs to be 
determined is whether the cancer rate among the exposed animals is significantly higher 
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than the cancer rate among the control animals. Unless it is significantly higher, it cannot be 
considered a genuine result of exposition to dioxin. 
Douglas doesn’t use the term of “null hypothesis” even once. But for reasons that will 
become clear in section 5, researchers should say that in experiments that use laboratory 
animals to find out whether dioxins cause liver cancer, the null hypothesis is (or should be) 
that dioxins don’t cause liver cancer. Douglas argues that whenever a hypothesis is tested, 
two levels of significance need to be determined: level α for the maximum probability of 
committing a type I error of rejecting the hypothesis if it is true, and level β for the maximum 
probability of committing a type II error of accepting the hypothesis if it is false. High α will 
lead to an excess of false positives, and high β to an excess of false negatives. 
Since the null hypothesis says that dioxins don’t cause liver cancer, an excess of false 
positives will lead to an over-regulation of the dioxin-producing parts of the industry because 
dioxins appear more toxic than they actually are. By contrast, an excess of false negatives 
will lead to an under-regulation of the dioxin-producing parts of the industry because dioxins 
appear less toxic than they actually are. And while an over-regulation is more in the interest 
of the general public, an under-regulation is more in the interest of the industry. 
There is a tricky issue in statistical hypothesis testing: the two levels of significance α and β 
trade off each other – the greater α (β), the smaller β (α). And there seems to be no way to 
determine α and β without passing a value judgment about the respective merits of under- or 
overregulating the dioxin-producing parts of the industry. According to Douglas, this is the 
first lower stage at which value judgments operate: whenever we determine the maximum 
probability of committing a type I (II) error, we need to evaluate the consequences of an 
excess of false positives (negatives). 
The second lower stage, at which Douglas thinks value judgments operate, is that of 
evidence characterization. In the case of lab animal experiments that test the hypothesis that 
dioxins don’t cause liver cancer, that is the level of expert pathologists judging whether a 
tissue sample has a cancerous lesion or not. Douglas asks readers to consider two extreme 
cases. In the first case, the pathologist judges all borderline cases to be non-cancerous 
lesions. Such an approach leads to an excess of false negatives and an under-regulation of 
the dioxin-producing parts of the industry. In the second case, the pathologist judges all 
borderline cases to be malignancies. Such an approach leads to an excess of false positives 
and an over-regulation of the dioxin-producing parts of the industry. 
Douglas argues that what a consideration of these cases tells us is that pathologists are 
similarly concerned with false positives and false negatives, though not as formally as at the 
level of selecting significance levels: that whenever judging whether a borderline case has a 
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cancerous lesion or not, pathologists need to evaluate the consequences of an excess of 
false positives or false negatives. If they prioritize the interests of the industry (the general 
public), they will tend to identify borderline cases as non-cancerous (malignant). 
The third lower stage, at which Douglas thinks value judgments operate, is that of the 
interpretation of results. In the case of lab animal experiments that test the hypothesis that 
dioxins don’t cause liver cancer, that is the level of answering the question whether there is a 
threshold for the carcinogenic effects of dioxins, where a threshold is understood as one of 
dosing the rats at x ng/kg/day. Douglas (2000, pp. 573-4) argues that there are two 
competing interpretations that give rise to a positive and a negative answer, respectively. 
The one giving rise to the positive answer relies on the Paracelsian assumption that the right 
dose differentiates the poison and the remedy. The one giving rise to the negative answer, 
by contrast, relies on the empirical finding that there is no threshold for the carcinogenic 
effects of radiation: great and small amounts of radiation do and do not cause cancer. 
Which of the two interpretations should we endorse? As there isn’t any fact of the matter that 
tells us which of them to prefer, we will take our pick in accordance with how we evaluate the 
consequences of our choices. If we falsely believe that there is a threshold, regulations will 
probably protect public health insufficiently; and if we falsely believe that there is no 
threshold, regulations will probably be overly stringent. Therefore, the interpretation we 
endorse will depend on whether we put the interests of the general public before the interests 
of the industry, or vice versa. The third lower stage is interesting but can be ignored in the 
remainder because the question of there being a threshold for the carcinogenic effects of 
dioxins is specific to the case of lab animal experiments that test hypotheses of the toxicity of 
substances. 
Douglas (2000, p. 565) concludes that “just as there is inductive risk for accepting theories, 
there is inductive risk for accepting methodologies, data, and interpretations”. She moves on 
to say that by “expanding where we see relevant inductive risk, the potential role for non-
epistemic values has also expanded”. She suggests, that is, that even if we manage to show 
that value judgments do not necessarily operate at the stage of hypothesis acceptance or 
rejection, we will still need to show that they do not necessarily operate at the three lower 
stages. 
But the problem with Douglas’s suggestion is that the inductive risk that is present at the 
three lower stages adds up to the total risk of the null hypothesis in accordance with the laws 
of probability (cf. Schurz, 2013, p. 330). This means that the total risk of the null hypothesis 
must not be lower than the inductive risk that is present at any of the three lower stages. In 
order to show that value judgments do not necessarily operate in the context of justification, 
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we accordingly need to show that they do not necessarily operate at the stage of hypothesis 
acceptance or rejection; we do not need to show that they do not necessarily operate at any 
of the three lower stages. 
Douglas (2007, pp. 9-10) believes that two problems confront the idea that the inductive risk 
that is present at the three lower stages adds up or “propagates” to the total risk of the null 
hypothesis. The first problem is that it can be difficult to estimate precisely the inductive risk 
that is present at any of the three lower stages; the second problem is the “more 
fundamental” problem that in order to estimate inductive risk, the scientist needs to make a 
probabilistic estimate, and that making such an estimate leads into a regress that is infinite 
unless at one point, the scientist accepts the hypothesis that the probability of another 
hypothesis is P. Douglas (2007, p. 10) indicates that the second “more fundamental” problem 
“is first discussed in Rudner 1953”. It is arguably the problem that Rudner (1953, p. 4) 
describes when anticipating Jeffrey’s objection to premise (1) of AIR. I am going to deal with 
that second problem in the following section. 
With respect to the first problem I would like to point out that in cases, where it is difficult to 
estimate precisely the inductive risk that is present at the second lower stage, scientists can 
work with upper or lower bounds of that risk. Consider the hypothesis that dioxins don’t 
cause liver cancer and the stage of expert pathologists judging whether a tissue sample has 
a cancerous lesion or not. In the presence of many borderline cases, it is difficult to estimate 
precisely the inductive risk of judging non-cancerous lesions to be malignancies, or of 
judging malignancies to be non-cancerous. But it is relatively easy to state upper and lower 
bounds of that risk. The upper (lower) bound of the inductive risk of judging non-cancerous 
lesions to be malignancies corresponds to the extreme case in which the pathologist judges 
all borderline cases to be malignancies (non-cancerous lesions). Similarly, the upper (lower) 
bound of the inductive risk of judging malignancies to be non-cancerous corresponds to the 
extreme case in which the pathologist judges all borderline cases to be non-cancerous 
lesions (malignancies). 
In Douglas’s analysis, the pathologist targets the upper (lower) bound of the inductive risk of 
judging non-cancerous lesions to be malignancies and the lower (upper) bound of the 
inductive risk of judging malignancies to be non-cancerous if she prioritizes the interests of 
the general public (industry). In section 5, however, I am going to explain why the pathologist 
who prioritizes neither the interests of the industry nor those the general public should target 
the lower bound of the inductive risk of judging non-cancerous lesions to be malignancies 
and the upper bound of the inductive risk of judging malignancies to be non-cancerous. 
Douglas’s discussion of experiments that use laboratory animals to find out whether dioxins 
cause liver cancer nicely illustrates the various stages of hypothesis confirmation in which 
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inductive risk is present. But it fails to demonstrate that we need to show that value 
judgments do not necessarily operate at the three lower stages if we manage to show that 
they do not necessarily operate at the upper stage. 
 
3. Hypothesis acceptance or probability assignment? 
Jeffrey’s objection to premise (1) of AIR says, to repeat, that “the activity proper to the 
scientist is the assignment of probabilities […] to […] hypotheses”, and not the acceptance or 
rejection of hypotheses. There are two criticisms that have been raised to this objection. 
Rudner (1953, p. 4) expresses the first criticism when anticipating Jeffrey’s objection. The 
criticism says that assigning probability P0 to hypothesis H0 is the same as accepting the 
hypothesis H1 that the probability of H0 is P0, and that accepting H1 presupposes value 
judgments. Jeffrey (1956, p. 246) responds that assigning probability P0 to H0 is not the same 
as accepting H1. But Douglas (2009, pp. 53-4) thinks that Jeffrey’s response leads into a 
vicious regress of assigning probabilities to probability assignments. 
It is by no means easy to state exactly the conditions under which a regress is vicious (cf. 
Priest, 2014, pp. 186-7). But in what follows, I shall assume that a regress is vicious if it is 
either infinite or circular. I will deal with infinity first and circularity second. The infinite regress 
of assigning probabilities to probability assignments looks as follows: 
P(H0) = P0, P(P(H0) = P0) = P1, P(P(P(H0) = P0) = P1) = P2 ... ad infinitum. 
Instead of accepting the hypothesis that P(H0) = P0, we assign another probability P1 to the 
hypothesis that P(H0) = P0, another probability P2 to the hypothesis that P(P(H0) = P0) = P1 
and so on. If the regress is infinite and Jeffrey’s response leads into this regress, then his 
response is arguably unjustified. But does it lead into this regress? I think that the answer is 
negative. 
I think it is negative because a regress of assigning probabilities to probability assignments 
remains an empty formalism unless it is interpreted as an epistemic regress, and because in 
scientific practice, an epistemic regress is unlikely to be infinite. I want to demonstrate the 
unlikely infinity of the epistemic regress for the case of the type of experiments that Douglas 
discusses. The scientific practice of these experiments is that of statistical hypothesis testing, 
and in statistical hypothesis testing, the epistemic regress is likely to be finite. In order to see 
that, consider a variant of the hypothesis test that at least one of the studies that Douglas 
cites (Kociba et al, 1978) conducts: a variant of a test with two independent samples and 
dichotomous outcomes. The test proceeds in 3 or 4 steps, depending on whether you think 
that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to hypotheses, or to accept or 
reject hypotheses. 
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In step 1, an experiment is designed in the way that Douglas describes. Let us assume that a 
random sample of n = 200 is drawn from a population of lab rats, that by some randomizing 
procedure, researchers assign n1 = 100 rats to a treatment group and n1 = 100 rats to a 
control group, and that the rats in the treatment group are exposed to dioxin, while the rats in 
the control groups remain non-dosed. Let us further assume that pathologists find 
malignancies in tissue samples of 25 of the rats in the treatment group and malignancies in 
tissue samples of only 15 of the rats in the control group, i.e. that the proportion of rats with 
malignancies in the treatment group is 0.25, while the proportion of rats with malignancies in 
the control group is 0.15. The following table summarizes the design of the experiment: 
 n 
N° of rats with 
malignancies 
Proportion 
Treatment group n1 = 100 x1 = 25 p1 = 0.25 
Control group n2 = 100 x2 = 15 p2 = 0.15 
 
In step 2 of the test, researchers assume that the distribution of p1 and p2 approximates 
standard normality. That assumption is likely to be satisfied because the individuals in the 
treatment and control groups form independent random samples (they have been assigned 
to a treatment and control group by some randomizing procedure), and because the two 
conditions for standard normality approximation, i.e. p1(1 − p1)n1 > 9 and p2(1 − p2)n2 > 9, are 
satisfied (we have p1(1 − p1)n1 = 16 and p2(1 − p2)n2 = 12.75). 
In step 3 of the test, the Central Limit Theorem is used to calculate the likelihood of the null 
hypothesis, i.e. the probability of observing p1 − p2 > 0 if in fact p1 − p2 = 0, where p1 − p2 = 0 
is selected as null hypothesis H0 (‘dioxins don’t cause liver cancer’) and p1 − p2 > 0 as 
alternative hypothesis. When using the Central Limit Theorem to calculate the likelihood of 
H0, we use the following test statistic: 
z = (p1 − p2)⋅[p(1−p)(1/n1 + 1/n2)]-1/2, 
where p = (x1 + x2) / (n1 + n2). The likelihood of H0 is then given as P(z > 1.754) = 1 − 0.96 = 
0.04, since in the standard normal distribution table, z = 1.754 corresponds to a probability of 
0.96. Those who think with Jeffrey that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign 
probabilities to hypotheses, form the prior probability of H0 and insert that probability together 
with the likelihood of H0 into Bayes’ theorem to calculate the posterior probability of H0. 
Those who think that the genuine task of the scientist is to accept or reject hypotheses 
proceed to step 4. 
In step 4, H0 is accepted or rejected in accordance with a decision rule that depends on the 
maximum probability α of committing a type I error of rejecting H0 if it is true. If, for instance, 
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- α = 0.05, the decision rule will require rejection of H0 if z > 1.645 because in the standard 
normal distribution table, z = 1.645 corresponds to a probability of 1 − 0.05 = 0.95. 
- α = 0.01, the decision rule will require rejection of H0 if z > 2.331 because in the standard 
normal distribution table, z = 2.331 corresponds to a probability of 1 − 0.01 = 0.99. 
For the experiment designed in step 1, this means that H0 will be rejected if α = 0.05 and 
accepted (or not rejected) if α = 0.01 (because z = 1.754). Following Douglas’s analysis, one 
may say that researchers prioritizing the interests of the general public tend to select a high 
value for α, while researchers prioritizing the interests of the industry tend to select a low 
value. I’m going to argue in section 5, however, that researchers who accept of reject 
hypotheses independently of the value judgments that they happen to endorse, likewise tend 
to select a low value for α. And I will explain in the following section why researchers don’t 
need to determine a maximum probability β of committing a type I error of accepting H0 if it is 
false. 
There is arguably an epistemic regress departing from step 3 of the test, proceeding to step 
2 and arriving at step 1. It is also possible to understand the regress as interpreting the 
regress of assigning probabilities to probability assignments: P0 is the posterior probability of 
H0; P1 (‘the probability that P0 is the probability of H0’) is the prior probability of H0 and the 
probability that p1 and p2 are approximately normally distributed; and P2 (‘the probability that 
P1 is the probability that P0 is the probability of H0’) is the probability that non-cancerous 
(cancerous) lesions have not been judged to be malignancies (non-cancerous), that potential 
confounders are distributed equally over the treatment and control group and so on. 
Estimations of these probabilities may even be quite precise: there are empirical procedures 
that can be used to test for the distribution of potential confounders over treatment and 
control groups; the probability that p1 and p2 are approximately normally distributed is quite 
high because the two conditions for normality approximation are satisfied; P0 is provided with 
a specific value; and as noted in the previous section, there are upper and lower bounds to 
the probability that non-cancerous (cancerous) lesions have not been judged to be 
malignancies (non-cancerous). 
But the important point is that the regress is not infinite: it ends with P(P(P(H0) = P0) = P1) = 
P2. There is no further probability P3 that P2 is the probability that … There is also no reason 
why researchers should be required to accept the hypothesis that the probability that non-
cancerous (cancerous) lesions have not been judged to be malignancies (non-cancerous), or 
that potential confounders are distributed equally over the treatment and control group. They 
assign a probability to that hypothesis (possibly in an informal way) and do not need to do 
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anything else. Thus, Jeffrey’s response does not lead into an infinite regress of assigning 
probabilities to probability assignments. 
How about the circular variant of that regress? It looks as follows: 
P(H0) = P0, P(P(H0) = P0) = P1, P(P(P(H0) = P0) = P1) = P2, P(H0) = P0 
Note that P(H0) = P0 shows up at the beginning and the end of the regress. Translated to 
hypothesis testing, the regress is one in which an experimental result (the result of a certain 
probability of the null hypothesis) is justified in terms of a the assumption of the approximate 
normal distribution of p1 and p2, and in which the experimental design is justified in terms of 
the experimental result. We cannot rule out that such circular reasoning ever occurs in 
hypothesis testing, but it is definitely not a norm. Thus, Jeffrey’s response does not lead into 
a circular regress of assigning probabilities to probability assignments either. 
The second criticism of Jeffrey’s objection says that scientists should accept or reject 
hypotheses because they are responsible for the actions that are taken on the basis of these 
hypotheses (Douglas, 2016, pp. 614-5, Wilholt, 2009, p. 94). In order to refute that criticism, 
Schurz (2013, pp. 325-328; 2014, p. 77) distinguishes categorical and hypothetical 
acceptances and rejections of hypotheses and argues that scientists (should) accept or 
reject hypotheses hypothetically, and not categorically, if they accept or reject hypotheses at 
all. He illustrates his distinction by means of a seismological example: if hypothesis H says 
that there won’t be an earthquake of magnitude 6 or higher (in a specified area within the 
next few days), and if seismologists assign a probability of 0.95 to H, then they accept H 
- categorically if they inform citizens that there won’t be an earthquake of magnitude 6 
or higher (if they sound the all-clear). 
- hypothetically if they inform citizens about the cost-utility trade off they face (if they 
say quite literally that citizens should evacuate their homes if they find that the cost of 
remaining in their homes during an earthquake is at least 20 times as high as the cost 
of evacuating their homes temporarily when there is no earthquake). 
Schurz (2013, p. 326) then mentions the legal trial after the earthquake in L’Aquila in 2009 as 
a case in point. The trial ended with a verdict that sentenced six seismologists for six years in 
prison for sounding the all-clear immediately before the earthquake. The verdict was later 
overturned: five of the seismologists were acquitted and only one of them, whose prison 
sentence was reduced, was found guilty of sounding the all-clear. But for Schurz, the trial is a 
case in point because it shows that scientists should not accept hypotheses categorically. 
The one seismologist, who was sentenced to prison, has indeed brought guilt upon him if it is 
true that he accepted the hypothesis that there won’t be a major earthquake in L’Aquila in 
April 2009 categorically, i.e. if he sounded the all-clear (as it seems he did). He should have 
been acquitted together with his colleagues, by contrast, if he had accepted that hypothesis 
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only hypothetically, i.e. if he had spoken of a low probability of that hypothesis, and if he had 
informed citizens of the cost-utility trade off that they faced. 
I conclude that Jeffrey’s objection remains unscathed: it is not obvious why Jeffrey’s 
response to Rudner’s criticism should lead into a vicious regress, and the claim that 
scientists should accept or reject hypotheses is too strong. This conclusion is not meant to 
imply that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to hypotheses, and not to 
accept or reject these hypotheses. As I pointed out in the introduction, I prefer to remain 
agnostic about the two alternatives. But what the conclusion implies is that AIR is potentially 
unsound because premise (1) is possibly false. 
 
4. Epistemic purity I: the Higgs boson discovery 
Levi’s objection says, to repeat, that there is an ambiguity in premises (2) and (3) of AIR: that 
the decision referred to in (2) is a decision about what to believe, while the decision referred 
to in (3) is a decision about how to act, that only the latter presupposes value judgments, and 
that the scientist qua scientist only needs to decide what to believe. Levi (1962, p. 48) argues 
that decisions about what to believe precede the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses in a 
non-behavioral sense, while decisions about how to act precede the acceptance or rejection 
of hypotheses in a behavioral sense. Thus, while Jeffrey, Douglas, Wilholt, and Schurz all 
understand (categorical) acceptances of hypotheses as acceptances in a behavioral sense, 
Levi (1960, p. 349) allows for the possibility of “accepting H in an ‘open-ended’ situation 
where there is no specific objective”.4 
Levi (1962, p. 49) understands a scientist who accepts or rejects hypotheses in a non-
behavioral sense as one who seeks “the truth and nothing but the truth”: as one who selects 
the true proposition from a set of competing possible propositions on the basis of the relevant 
evidence. Levi (1962, p. 51) points out that two constraints operate in the search for truth and 
nothing but the truth. The first (“hypothesis impartiality”) requires that (a) the scientist do not 
prefer that any proposition from a set of competing propositions be true rather than another. 
The second (“error impartiality”) requires that (b) she do not regard any possible error as 
being more serious that another.5 I am going to deal with error impartiality first, and with 
hypothesis impartiality second. 
Remember that Douglas points out that significance level α for the maximum probability of 
committing a type I error and significance level β for the maximum probability of committing a 
type II error trade of each other, and that there seems to be no way to determine α and β 
																																																								
4  Levi (1960, p. 349) in fact reads Jeffrey as allowing for both possibilities (of accepting H in a 
behavioral and a non-behavioral sense) as well. 
5  I borrow the terms “hypothesis impartiality” and “error impartiality” from Staley (2017, p. 12). 
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without passing a value judgment about the respective consequences of selecting a high α 
or β. It seems impossible that a researcher can exactly balance these consequences and 
regard both errors as being equally serious. So how does Levi argue in favor of the 
possibility of error impartiality? 
His argument involves the proposal that outcomes that fall outside the critical region should 
lead to suspension of judgment rather than acceptance of the null hypothesis, where the 
critical region is the region of test statistic values that result in rejection of the null hypothesis 
(in the example of section 3, this is the region where z > 1.645 if α = 0.05 and z > 2.331 if α = 
0.01). Under this proposal, the result of rejecting a true null hypothesis is a mistake, while the 
result of suspending judgment about a false null hypothesis is not. Scientists may 
accordingly take type I errors more seriously than type II ‘errors’ without violating error 
impartiality (cf. Levi, 1962, pp. 62-3). Levi points out that significance level α remains a 
matter of choice on the part of the investigator. But he also believes that α serves as “a 
rough index of the degree of caution exercised in a search for truth” (Levi, 1962, p. 63). He 
doesn’t think that this index presupposes value judgments. 
One might respond that Levi’s proposal only pushes back the problem of selecting adequate 
significance levels to the stage of selecting the null hypothesis. In Douglas’s example, high α 
will lead to an over-regulation (under-regulation) of the dioxin-producing parts of the industry 
if the null hypothesis says that dioxins don’t cause (cause) liver cancer. If it is impossible for 
the scientist to remain impartial about null hypotheses and their alternatives, it will be 
impossible for her to remain impartial about errors. So how does Levi argue for the possibility 
of hypothesis impartiality? 
His argument involves a well-known doctrine of classical hypothesis testing that Levi (1962, 
p. 62) quotes when saying that “the null hypothesis is to be selected in such a way that type I 
error will be more serious than type II error”. What needs to be understood, however, is that 
the seriousness in question is in the eye of the truth-seeking scientist. In the eye of that 
scientist, type I error (of rejecting a true null hypothesis) will be more serious than type II 
error (of accepting a false null hypothesis) as long as rejecting the null hypothesis amounts 
to a scientific discovery. 
Classical hypothesis testing can be employed to test for all sorts of hypotheses: the 
hypothesis that a particular consignment of tulip bulbs contains 40 percent of the yellow- and 
60 percent of the red-flowering sort, the hypothesis that the prevalence of cardiovascular 
disease among non-smokers in a given population is 10 percent and so on. In such cases I 
am unsure whether the truth-seeking scientist can select the null hypothesis in such a way 
that type I error will be more serious than type II error. But as long as rejecting a hypothesis 
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amounts to a scientific discovery, the scientist needs to select that hypothesis as null 
hypothesis. The reason is that future research will build on that discovery: if the entity 
discovered is a causal relation, scientists will investigate the underlying mechanism; if the 
entity is a new particle, scientists will investigate its properties and so on. If rejecting the null 
hypothesis amounts to a scientific discovery, type I error will be more serious because future 
research would be misguided if a true null hypothesis were rejected. 
Wilholt (2009, pp. 95-6) claims that Levi’s conception of a decision about what to believe 
“presupposes a sense of purity of epistemic activity that is exaggerated and unrealistic”. In 
the present and following section, I will concede that this claim is roughly correct. I will also 
argue, however, that what contaminates the epistemic activity of deciding what to believe is 
not necessarily a value judgment. In the rest of the present section, I will deal with the less 
controversial case of the Higgs boson discovery. In the following section, I will turn to the 
more controversial case of science with clear non-epistemic impacts. 
The Higgs boson discovery is the result of one comprehensive hypothesis test relying on the 
following statistical model (cf. van Dyk, 2014, p. 55): 
Nmsc ∼ Poisson[βsc(θsc, m) + κsc(φsc, m)µ] 
I will first explain the variables and parameters and then their subscripts. N is the number of 
observed events. An event is a proton-proton collision produced by the Large Hadron 
Collider (LHC) near Geneva. A proton-proton collision results in a trajectory of final-state 
particles. Particle detectors identify these particles by determining their momenta and/or 
energy. At the LHC, there are seven particle detectors. Two of them, ATLAS and CMS, were 
involved in the discovery of a Higgs boson. They identified this particle primarily through two 
decay channels: a Higgs boson decay into two photons (H → γγ) and a Higgs boson decay 
into two Z bosons (H → ZZ), each of which decays, in turn, into two leptons (either electrons 
or muons). 
The LHC produces millions of events per second but not of all of these are “observed”. The 
particle detectors have triggers that make very fast decisions as to whether an event is 
interesting or uninteresting, where an event is uninteresting if it involves well-understood 
physics. Rather than storing all events, the particle detectors save only those events that the 
triggers decide are interesting; these events amount to approximately 100 per second. 
Although this is a small fraction of the total events, it could still result in 1010 saved events for 
each experiment over the expected 15-year life span of the LHC. These saved events are 
the observed events. Their distribution is a Poisson distribution because counting the 
observed events is a Bernoulli trial (a random trial with exactly two possible outcomes: Higgs 
boson decay and no Higgs boson decay) with very large N and extremely low probabilities. 
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β(θ, m) models the “expected background count”: the number of events that can be expected 
to occur if all we have is well-understood physics, i.e. if the null hypothesis is true (the 
number of particle decays that do not represent Higgs boson decays). 
κ(φ, m) models the “expected Higgs boson count”: the number of events that can be 
expected to occur if in addition to well-understood physics, there is new physics, i.e. if the 
null hypothesis is false (the number of particle decays that represent Higgs boson decays). 
θ and φ are (vectors of) nuisance parameters (i.e. of parameters not primarily of interest: e.g. 
variances if the mean is a parameter of interest). 
m is the Higgs mass associated with a specific “bin”. A bin is a potential Higgs mass on a fine 
grid of values of mH (the unknown Higgs mass). Once a Higgs boson is discovered, its mass 
can be estimated by including mH in the model. Estimations indicate that the actual Higgs 
mass lies in the mass region around 126 GeV (126⋅109 electronvolts). 
µ is signal strength: the strength with which a particle decay “signals” its being a Higgs boson 
decay. Signal strength is a function of the (unknown) Higgs mass: the signal is strongest 
near the actual Higgs mass. Signal strength is defined so that µ = 0 corresponds to the 
“background only hypothesis”, i.e. to the hypothesis that the observed particle decays do not 
represent Higgs boson decays, and µ = 1 to the hypothesis that the observed particle decays 
represent Higgs boson and other particle decays. This allows µ = 0 to serve as the null 
hypothesis subjected to significance testing. 
I now turn to the subscripts of the variables and parameters. The subscripts indicate that the 
choice of both the background and Higgs boson models (their parameters and functional 
forms) is different for each category (stratum) s of (decay) channel c. The choice is different 
because once the particle detectors have saved the events that their triggers decide are 
interesting, events are “cut” within each decay channel, and because the events that survive 
the cuts are “stratified” into relatively homogenous categories: into categories with 
homogenous signal-to-background ratios and invariant mass resolutions. 
The cuts aim to focus the analysis on a subset of events wherein new physical particles are 
more likely to be observed. The fraction of events that survive the cuts and involve new 
physics can be as low as 10-8. In the actual Higgs boson discovery there were only a few 
hundred events in the two primary decay channels that could be associated with a Higgs 
boson decay. Stratification aims to increase the statistical power for identifying possible 
excess events above background that are due to new physics. 
It is not entirely clear whether particle physicists can be said to accept the hypothesis that 
there are Higgs bosons. At least in official statements, they prefer to say that there is 
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“conclusive evidence for the discovery of a new particle”, and that this evidence “is 
compatible with the hypothesis that the new particle is the Standard Model Higgs boson” 
(ATLAS collaborators, 2012, p. 15). But apart from these statements, which might simply 
express an abundance of caution, the Higgs boson discovery seems to exemplify a decision 
about what to believe rather well. 
Particle physicists selected µ = 0 as null hypothesis, because they believed that type I error 
(of rejecting a true hypothesis) will be more serious than type II error (of accepting a false 
hypothesis) if the null hypothesis says that µ = 0. They believed that type I error will be more 
serious because future research would be misguided if µ = 0 were rejected if true. At the 
same time, they selected a high “degree of caution” to minimize the risk of rejecting a true 
null hypothesis: 6σ and 5σ in the ATLAS and CMS experiments, respectively, where a level 
of 5σ corresponds to a probability of about 1 in 3.4 million. 
There have been several reasons for selecting a significance level of 5σ or higher. A purely 
conventional reason is that 5σ is the significance level that editors of particle physics journals 
generally require to claim a detection. Dawid (2015, pp. 79-80) cites a purely epistemic 
reason for selecting 5σ: the attempt to keep in check the so-called look-elsewhere effect, i.e. 
the problem that the probability of µ = 0 that can be calculated for any category s of channel 
c (the “global” p-value) is greater than the minimum probability of µ = 0 that can be calculated 
for a specific category s of channel c (the “local” p-value). Van Dyk (2014, p. 54) mentions a 
pragmatic reason for selecting 5σ: the attempt to account for model misspecifications that, 
given the large number of models for each category s of channel c, seem quite likely. Staley 
(2017b, p. 357) mentions another pragmatic reason: a “consideration of both the negative 
consequences of an erroneous discovery claim and the value for the further pursuit of inquiry 
of a correct discovery claim.” 
It is true that only one of these reasons is purely epistemic. One may accordingly think that 
even in the case of the Higgs boson discovery, a decision about what to believe 
“presupposes a sense of purity of epistemic activity that is exaggerated and unrealistic”. But 
what contaminates epistemic activity in the case of the Higgs boson discovery is not a value 
judgment, but a bunch of conventional or pragmatic reasons. A good way to think about the 
difference is in terms of conditionals, the consequents of which make reference to 
methodological decisions (select µ = 0 as null hypothesis, select 5σ or higher as significance 
level and so on). It is only in the case of value judgments that the antecedents refer to 
valuations of the utility of specific individuals or groups. In the case of conventional or 
pragmatic reasons, the antecedents make reference to technical goals (that of keeping the 
look-elsewhere effect in check, that of accounting for model misspecifications and so on). 
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One may of course object that technical goals are made explicit in official communiqués, 
while the utility valuations determine the methodological decisions as a matter of fact. One 
may argue with Staley (2017b, p. 369), for instance, that a false discovery claim would have 
been “tremendously embarrassing” for the physicists involved in the Higgs search, and that 
the 5σ significance level was selected to avoid that potential embarrassment.6 But the 
objection is not only “speculative” (as Staley himself admits); it also ignores that the wider 
community of scientists would not accept methodological decisions if they were taken to 
increase the utility of specific individuals or groups. It ignores, for instance, that the majority 
of physicists not involved in the Higgs search would not accept the selection of 5σ as 
significance level if that selection would not allow for the achievement of specific technical 
goals.7 
Staley (2017a, pp. 17-8; 2017b, p. 368) states that Levi’s view about significance level α 
seems close to the view expressed by Douglas, and that his (Staley’s) point that 5σ has been 
selected for a pragmatic reason resembles AIR. This statement seems to suggest that a 
decision about what to believe is impossible without value judgments even in the case of the 
Higgs boson discovery. It is important to understand, however, that this impossibility does not 
follow from Staley’s analysis of the Higgs boson discovery. Staley (2017, p. 23) concedes 
that “the negative consequences of an erroneous discovery claim and the value for the 
further pursuit of inquiry of a correct discovery claim” can be regarded as epistemic values in 
a sense proposed by Steel. Staley prefers to think of these values as pragmatic, but what is 
clear is that they do not qualify as non-epistemic in the sense of value judgments. Thus even 
under Staley’s analysis, the Higgs boson discovery exemplifies a decision about what to 
believe on the part of physicists: a decision that is epistemically pure in the sense of not 
depending on value judgments, but not epistemically pure in the sense of not depending on 
pragmatic considerations. 
 
5. Epistemic purity II: science with non-epistemic impact 
The more interesting question is, of course, whether science with clear non-epistemic impact 
(i.e. with impact on the utility of specific individuals or groups) may likewise exemplify a 
decision about what to believe that is epistemically pure in a similar sense. I think that the 
																																																								
6  Staley (2017b, p. 370) mentions further utility valuations, e.g. the anticipation of “negative 
consequences for the funding of HEP” and “a broader sense of responsibility toward the public 
perception of science in general”. Notice that he refers to both technical goals and utility valuations as 
“pragmatic”, while I reserve the term for technical goals. 
7  What complicates matters a little is that the suitability of methodological decisions for 
achieving technical goals can be questioned (cf. van Dyk, 2014, p. 54). But the fact remains that the 
wider community of scientists would not accept a methodological decision unless it allows for the 
achievement of technical goals. 
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answer is positive, and I would like to return to Douglas’s discussion of lab rat experiments to 
defend that answer. In Douglas’s discussion of experiments that use lab rats to find out 
whether dioxins cause liver cancer, selecting high α (β) and low β (α) and judging most or all 
borderline cases to be malignancies (non-cancerous) leads to an excess of false positives 
(negatives) and an overregulation (under-regulation) of the dioxin-producing parts of the 
industry if the null hypothesis says that dioxins do not cause (cause) liver cancer. To “accept 
or reject” a hypothesis means to “accept or reject” the hypothesis in a behavioral sense: to 
act on the basis of that hypothesis, i.e. to (under- or over-) regulate the dioxin producing 
parts of the industry. Scientists will accordingly select high α (β) and low β (α) and judge 
most or all borderline cases to be malignancies (non-cancerous) if they prioritize the interests 
of the general public (the industry) and the null hypothesis says that dioxins do not cause 
liver cancer; they will select high β (α) and low α (β) and judge most or all borderline cases to 
be non-cancerous lesions (malignancies) if they prioritize the interests of the general public 
(the industry) and the null hypothesis says that dioxins cause liver cancer. 
What if “accepting or rejecting a hypothesis” is understood in a non-behavioral sense? Then 
the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis is preceded by a decision about what to believe 
that does not rely on judgments about the respective merits of under- or overregulating the 
dioxin-producing parts of the industry. Is it possible for a scientist to take such a decision in 
an experiment that uses lab rats to find out whether dioxins cause liver cancer? I don’t see 
why the answer should be negative. The scientist will conduct a hypothesis test that is similar 
to the one presented in section 3. 
She will first design an experiment like the one that Douglas describes. She will, secondly, 
make assumptions about the underlying probability distribution. Third, she will select the 
hypothesis that dioxins don’t cause liver cancer as null hypothesis because she will judge 
that committing a type I error of rejecting a true null will be more serious than committing a 
type II error of accepting a false null if the null hypothesis says that dioxins don’t cause liver 
cancer. She will judge that committing a type I error will be more serious because as a 
scientist seeking “the truth and nothing but the truth”, she will understand that rejecting the 
hypothesis that dioxins don’t cause liver cancer amounts to the discovery of a causal 
relationship, that future research should investigate the mechanism underlying that 
relationship, and that future research would be misguided if the hypothesis were rejected if it 
were true. 
The scientist will finally judge most or all borderline cases to be non-cancerous lesions and 
select low α because as a scientist seeking “the truth and nothing but the truth”, she aims to 
minimize the risk of rejecting the null hypothesis if it is true. She will not explicitly select any 
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value for β because as a scientist seeking “the truth and nothing but the truth”, she 
understands that test statistic values that fall outside the critical region should lead to 
suspension of judgment rather than acceptance of the null hypothesis. She will reject the null 
hypothesis (and decide to believe that dioxins cause liver cancer) if her test statistic value 
falls inside the critical region, but she will suspend judgment otherwise. 
Her judgment of borderline cases and her selections of the null hypothesis and significance 
level α depend on a pragmatic “consideration of both the negative consequences of an 
erroneous discovery claim and the value for the further pursuit of inquiry of a correct 
discovery claim.” It is important to understand, however, that her judgment of borderline 
cases and her selections of the null hypothesis and significance level α remain unaffected by 
judgments about the respective merits of under- or overregulating the dioxin-producing parts 
of the industry. She takes a decision about what to believe independently of any of the value 
judgments that she happens to endorse. 
There are two objections that one might feel should be raised to the idea that in experiments 
using lab rats to find out whether dioxins cause liver cancer, scientists can take decisions 
about what to be believe independently of value judgments. The first objection seems to 
confirm the Marxist suspicion that scientists are “sycophants of capital”. It says that the 
scientists who (only seem to) take decisions about what to believe independently of value 
judgments in fact serve the interests of the industry involuntarily and unconsciously. Since α 
(the maximum probability of committing a type I error) and β (the maximum probability of 
committing a type II error) trade off each other, low α will lead to high β and, consequently, 
an excess of false negatives and an under-regulation of the dioxin-producing parts of the 
industry if the null hypothesis says that dioxins don’t cause liver cancer. 
But the objection looses sight of the fact that one would likewise have to say that in science 
with clear non-epistemic impact (such as pharmacology), scientists who (only seem to) take 
decisions about what to believe independently of value judgments sometimes serve the 
interests of the general public involuntarily and unconsciously. Consider, for instance, the 
hypothesis that selective serotin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) have a favorable risk-benefit 
profile in anti-depression treatment.8 The scientists seeking “the truth and nothing but the 
truth” will select the hypothesis that SSRIs do not have a favorable risk-benefit profile as null 
hypothesis because she understands that rejecting that hypothesis amounts to a scientific 
discovery, and that committing a type I error will be more serious than committing a type II 
error if the null hypothesis says that SSRIs do not have a favorable risk-benefit profile. She 
will then select low α because she aims to minimize the risk of committing a type I error. 
																																																								
8  I borrow the example from Brown (2008, p. 193). 
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Since α and β (the maximum probability of committing a type II error) trade off each other, 
low α will lead to high β and, consequently, an excess of false negatives and a restriction of 
trade in SSRIs, which benefits the general public if the risk-benefit profile of SSRIs turns out 
to be unfavorable (as it in fact did). 
But the objection also looses sight of the fact that under Levi’s proposal, α and β do not trade 
off each other (because a type I error is a mistake, while a type II ‘error’ is not), that the 
scientist seeking “the truth and nothing but the truth” will accept the alternative hypothesis 
only in a non-behavioral sense if she manages to reject the null hypothesis, and that she will 
never accept the null hypothesis (she will only suspend judgment about whether or not 
dioxins cause liver cancer if she doesn’t manage to reject the null hypothesis). It is 
accordingly false to say that low α will lead to high β and an under-regulation of the dioxin-
producing parts of the industry, or more generally, that significance level selections will lead 
to any type of policy measure. 
Policy measures will, in any case, remain in the hands of the authorities. If the scientist 
seeking “the truth and nothing but the truth” manages to reject the null hypothesis, she will 
accept the alternative hypothesis, but “accepting the alternative hypothesis” is not 
synonymous with “acting on the basis of it”. Acting on the basis of it will be left to the 
authorities who will (hopefully) regulate the dioxin-producing parts of the industry. If the 
scientist seeking “the truth and nothing but the truth” does not manage to reject the null 
hypothesis, she will not accept the null hypothesis, but suspend judgment about whether or 
not dioxins cause liver cancer. Action will again be left to the authorities who will under-
regulate the dioxin-producing parts of the industry if they prioritize the interests of the 
industry and over-regulate the industry if they prioritize the interest of the general public. 
They might also be able, however, to balance the interests of the general public and the 
industry to a reasonable degree. 
The second objection that one might feel should be raised to the idea that in experiments 
using lab rats to find out whether dioxins cause liver cancer, scientists can take decisions 
about what to be believe independently of value judgments, is that such scientists are 
fictions. No scientist conducting experiments of this kind ever judges borderline cases or 
selects null hypotheses and significance levels independently of the judgments about the 
respective merits of over- and under-regulating the dioxin-producing parts of the industry. 
The objection is not only as speculative as the objection mentioned toward the end of the 
preceding section; it also misses its target. The idea is that in experiments using lab rats to 
find out whether dioxins cause liver cancer, scientists can take decisions about what to be 
believe independently of value judgments. Even if they often fail to take such decisions, they 
are at least capable of taking them. 
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Let me try to explain why I think that it is important to insist that it is at least possible for them 
to take such decisions. Authors like Brown and Wilholt like to cite meta-studies that find that 
“only 5 percent of published reports on new drugs that were sponsored by the developing 
company gave unfavorable assessments”, while “38 percent of published reports were not 
favorable when the investigation of the same drugs was sponsored by an independent 
source” (Brown, 2008, p. 191); that “90% of government-funded experiments on low-dose 
exposure to bisphenol A reported significant [detrimental health] effects, while not a single 
industry-funded experimental study did so” (Wilholt, 2009, p. 93); and so on. What these 
meta-studies show is that in pharmacology, material or group interests (usually, but not 
necessarily, those of the pharmaceutical industry) often bias decisions about what to believe. 
But scientists need to hold on to the value-free ideal if they wish to criticize what they 
perceive to be biased decisions, and if they wish to avoid being drawn into “critical 
interactions among scientists of different points of view” (Longino, 1996, p. 40). According to 
Longino (1996, p. 40), these interactions aim “to mitigate the influence of subjective 
preferences on […] theory choice” and “to transform the subjective into the objective”. But 
perhaps one might also understand them as aiming to establish one set of value judgments 
as superior to another. Scientists who wish to criticize what they perceive to be biased 
decisions, and who wish to avoid “critical interactions”, will need to assume that it is possible 
to decide what to believe independently of material or group interests (or value judgments, 
more generally). 
Philosophers who accept the conclusion of AIR feel compelled to believe that for science 
“that has clear non-epistemic impacts, being ‘value-free’ is not a laudable goal” (Douglas, 
2000, p. 560), or that science is determined by conventional standards solving coordination 
problems (Wilholt, 2009, pp. 97-99). It is important to understand, however, that scientists 
won’t be able to criticize a pharmaceutical study for being biased by the material interests of 
the industry if being ‘value-free’ is not a laudable goal, and that what they criticize when 
criticizing a pharmaceutical study for being biased by material interests cannot be the 
violation of a conventional standard that is supposed to solve coordination problems. Material 
or group interests (or value judgments of various sorts) might, after all, bias the defense or 
implementation of that standard itself. Scientists need to hold on to the value-free idea if they 
wish to criticize a pharmaceutical study for being biased by the material interests of the 
industry, and if they want to avoid being drawn into critical interactions. In order to hold onto 
the ideal, they do not need to attain it as a matter of fact. But they need to be capable of 





The argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and others, famously concludes 
that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. In the preceding sections, I tried to 
show that trust in the soundness of the argument is overrated because philosophers who 
endorse its conclusion (especially Douglas and Wilholt) fail to refute two of the most 
important objections that have been raised to its soundness: Jeffrey’s objection that the 
genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to (and not to accept or reject) 
hypotheses, and Levi’s objection that the argument is ambiguous about decisions about how 
to act and decisions about what to believe, that only the former presuppose value judgments, 
and that qua scientist, the scientist only needs to decide what to believe. 
I pointed out that Douglas argues against Jeffrey’s objection that it leads into a vicious 
regress of assigning probabilities to probability assignments, that Douglas and Wilholt argue 
against Jeffrey’s objection that scientists should accept or reject hypotheses because they 
are responsible for the actions that are taken on the basis of these hypotheses, and that 
Wilholt (2009, pp. 95-6) argues against Levi’s objection that his conception of a decision 
about what to believe “presupposes a sense of purity of epistemic activity that is exaggerated 
and unrealistic”. 
I then tried to show in section 3 that Jeffrey’s objection is unlikely to lead into a vicious 
regress, and that (as Schurz suggests) scientists should accept or reject hypotheses only 
hypothetically (if they should accept or reject hypotheses at all). I tried to show in sections 4 
and 5 that decisions about what to believe might not be epistemically pure in the sense 
envisaged by Levi, but that what supplements decisions about what to believe may be 
pragmatic considerations that do not necessarily involve value judgments. 
Let me conclude by making a couple of remarks on what I did not try to show, and what I 
think would be worth investigating in the future. As I mentioned in the introduction, I did not 
try to defend either Jeffrey’s or Levi’s objection. I pointed out that a defense of both 
objections would be self-defeating because the view that the activity proper to the scientist is 
not the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses is incompatible with the view that the scientist 
qua scientist needs to decide what to believe. Thus an interesting question concerns the 
genuine task of the scientist: is it the assignment of probabilities, a decision about what to 
believe, or something else? The answer to this question depends on the respective positions 
of realism or antirealism that one is prepared to adopt (cf. footnote 2 above). So another 
interesting questions relates to the exact nature of these positions and to the reasons that 
speak against and in favor of these positions. 
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I did not try to show either that the scientist qua scientist does not make value judgments, or 
that value judgments do not necessarily operate in the context of justification. I tried to show 
that trust in the soundness of AIR is overrated, but I am fully aware that there are other 
arguments that aim to derive the same conclusion as AIR. Let me name one of these 
arguments: an argument that Longino has developed in a series of books and papers 
(especially in Longino, 1990), i.e. the argument from empirical underdetermination (AEU). 
AEU derives the conclusion that the scientist makes value judgments qua scientist from (a 
variant of) Quine’s thesis of the underdetermination of scientific hypotheses by empirical 
evidence, i.e. from the thesis that scientific hypotheses are underdetermined by empirical 
evidence persistently and non-sporadically (cf. Norton, 2008, p. 20). 
I think that Norton (2008, pp. 18, 19) is right when saying that “the underdetermination thesis 
is little more than speculation”, and that the question of the empirical underdetermination of 
scientific hypotheses should be decided “on a case-by-case basis”. But once we observe that 
a scientist accepts or rejects a scientific hypothesis, even though that hypothesis is 
empirically underdetermined (once we observe, for instance, that a scientist accepts the null 
hypothesis, even though outcomes fall outside the critical region), we will have reason to 
believe that the scientist makes a value judgment. Without further ado, we won’t be able to 
decide what value judgment the scientist makes, or whether the scientist makes the value 
judgment qua scientist. But we will observe the operation of a value judgment at the core of 
scientific activity, and an interesting question concerns possible methods of identifying that 
judgment. 
Another interesting question relates to the ideal organization of scientific discourse in cases, 
in which the empirical under-determination of a scientific hypothesis is persistent and non-
sporadic. As has been pointed out toward the end of the preceding section, Longino (1996, 
p. 40) recommends “critical interactions among scientists of different points of view”. She 
also proposes specific rules that should govern these interactions (cf. e.g. Longino 1996, p. 
40). One may doubt, however, whether the rules are adequate, or whether the interactions 
really have the ability that Longino claims they have (“to mitigate the influence of subjective 
preferences on […] theory choice” and “to transform the subjective into the objective”). One 
may, alternatively, recommend discussions among scientists (perhaps involving the general 
public) about the respective merits of various value judgments and propose rules that should 
govern these discussions. One may also question, however, whether these discussions will 
take us anywhere, and pray for empirical evidence to be forthcoming and to remove the 
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